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The United States Supreme Court this term reassertedthe rule of law in the context of the detainees in the waron terrorism.  At the same time, this was a term of
unanswered questions.  The Court handed down several deci-
sions that had far-reaching implications that were not
addressed by the Court’s opinions.  Two cases with the greatest
practical input on the day-to-day administration of justice were
criminal cases: Crawford v. Washington,1 concerning the admis-
sibility of hearsay at criminal trials, and Blakely v. Washington,2
regarding the proper role of judges and juries in determining
aggravating factors that justify harsher sentences.  Each opin-
ion left many unresolved issues that will require further court
interpretation in future cases.
In this article, we review the Court’s decisions in criminal
cases and in habeas corpus actions challenging criminal con-
victions.  In the next issue of Court Review, we will review the
past term’s cases involving civil rights, the First Amendment,
federalism, presidential power, and civil statutory interpreta-
tion.
FOURTH AMENDMENT
In United States v. Banks,3 Justice Souter, writing for a unan-
imous Court, determined that a 15- to 20-second wait between
the time the officers knocked on the door and announced their
presence to execute a drug-trafficking search warrant and their
forced entry was not unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.  Several officers arrived at respondent’s apartment
to execute a drug-trafficking warrant.  The officers at the front
of the building knocked and announced themselves loudly
enough to be heard by the officers at the back.  Unbeknownst
to the officers, respondent was at home, but was in the shower
and did not hear the officers.  After waiting between 15 to 20
seconds, the officers forced entry into the apartment.  The offi-
cers found drugs and weapons during their search and respon-
dent sought to have them excluded from evidence on the
ground that the officers had waited an unreasonably short time
before forcing entry.  The Court concluded that between the
time the officers knocked on the door and the time they forced
entry, exigent circumstances arose because “15 to 20 seconds
does not seem an unrealistic guess about the time someone
would need to get in a position to rid his quarters of cocaine.”
The Court applied a “totality analysis,” specifically rejecting
the Ninth Circuit’s attempts to create a set of “sub-rules” to
govern what constitutes a reasonable amount of time.  To reach
its conclusion, the Court relied on Wilson v. Arkansas4 and
United States v. Ramirez.5 In Wilson, the Court held “the com-
mon law knock-and-announce principle is one focus of the rea-
sonableness inquiry; and we subsequently decided that
although the standard generally requires the police to
announce their intent to search before entering closed
premises, the obligation gives way when officers ‘have a rea-
sonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their pres-
ence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous
or futile or . . . would inhibit the effective investigation of the
crime by, for example, allowing destruction of evidence.’”
Ramirez stated that in exigent circumstances, officers may dam-
age the premises as is necessary for a forced entry.
In Maryland v. Pringle,6 Justice Rehnquist delivered the opin-
ion for a unanimous court, which upheld the arrest of all three
occupants of a car in which cocaine was found after each had
denied ownership of the drugs.  Respondent was one of three
occupants in a car, which was stopped by an officer for a traffic
violation.  The officer noticed a large amount of cash in the
glove compartment and a subsequent search of the vehicle
“yielded $763 from the glove compartment and five glassine
baggies containing cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest.”
All three occupants of the car denied ownership of the cocaine
and money and were arrested.  After being given Miranda warn-
ings, respondent stated that the money and cocaine were his
and that the other occupants knew nothing about it.  At trial,
respondent moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds
that the officer had no probable cause to arrest him.  
The Court first noted that “[i]t is uncontested . . . that the
officer, upon recovering the five plastic glassine baggies con-
taining suspected cocaine, had probable cause to believe a
felony had been committed.”  Thus, the only question remain-
ing is “whether the officer had probable cause to believe that
Pringle committed that crime.” The Court said that “[t]o deter-
mine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an indi-
vidual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then
decide ‘whether these historical facts, viewed from the stand-
point of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to’
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probable cause.”  The Court then analyzed the facts of the case
before it: (1) Pringle was one of the three men riding in the car
during the early hours of the morning; (2) there was $763 of
rolled-up cash in the glove compartment directly in front of
Pringle; (3) five plastic glassine baggies of cocaine were found
in a place accessible to all three men; and (4) all three men
failed to offer any information with respect to the ownership of
the cocaine or money.  Given these facts, the Court concluded
that it was “an entirely reasonable inference . . . that any or all
three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercise domin-
ion and control over, the cocaine.”  Therefore, a reasonable offi-
cer could conclude “that there was probable cause to believe
Pringle committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either
solely or jointly.”
Justice Breyer, writing for a six-person majority in Illinois v.
Lidster,7 concluded that a checkpoint stop to obtain informa-
tion from motorists about a hit-and-run accident, not likely
committed by any of the motorists who were stopped, did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.  An unknown motorist struck
and killed a 70-year-old bicyclist; about one week later, police
implemented a highway checkpoint “to obtain more informa-
tion about the accident from the motoring public.”
Respondent was stopped at the checkpoint, arrested, and even-
tually convicted for driving under the influence of alcohol.  He
challenged his conviction, arguing that the government had
obtained much of the relevant evidence through use of a check-
point stop that violated the Fourth Amendment.  
The Court disagreed.  It concluded that the checkpoint here
differed from the one the Court found unconstitutional in
Indianapolis v. Edmund,8 because, unlike in Edmund, the “pur-
pose was not to determine whether a vehicle’s occupants were
committing a crime, but to ask vehicle occupants, as members
of the public, for their help in providing information about a
crime in all likelihood committed by others.”  The Court states,
Edmund aside, the Fourth Amendment would not “have us
apply an Edmund-type rule of automatic unconstitutionality to
brief, information-seeking highway stops of the kind now
before us.”  First, “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not treat a
motorist’s car as his castle.”  Therefore, “special law enforce-
ment concerns will sometimes justify highway stops without
individualized suspicion.”  Like certain other forms of police
activity, i.e., crowd control or public safety, “an information-
seeking stop is not the kind of event that involves suspicion, or
lack of suspicion, of the relevant individual.”  Further, the
Court noted, “information-seeking stops are less likely to pro-
voke anxiety or to prove intrusive.”  Although “the importance
of soliciting the public’s assistance is offset to some degree by
the need to stop a motorist to obtain that help . . . [t]he differ-
ence . . . is not important enough to justify an Edmund-type rule
here.”  The Court’s analysis did not end there; it also concluded
that the checkpoint stop was reasonable: (1) the Court found
that “[t]he relevant public concern was grave;” (2) it concluded
that “[t]he stop advances this grave public concern to a signif-
icant degree;” and (3) “[m]ost importantly, the stops interfered
only minimally with liberty of
the sort the Fourth Amendment
seeks to protect.”
Justice Stevens delivered the
opinion of a 5-4 Court in Groh
v. Ramirez.9 It held that a war-
rant that fails to describe with
particularity the things or per-
sons to be seized is facially
invalid, even if the application
for the warrant, which was not
incorporated by reference, did
describe these things in detail.  It also concluded that the offi-
cer in charge of the search was not entitled to qualified immu-
nity because he drafted the warrant and no reasonable officer
could believe that the warrant was valid.  Petitioner Jeff Groh,
an agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
(ATF), was informed that Ramirez had “a large stock of
weaponry” at his ranch.  The application for the warrant
described with particularity the items to be seized, but the war-
rant form submitted with the application, and signed by the
magistrate judge, did not.  Nor did the warrant incorporate by
reference the application.  Petitioner and other officers exe-
cuted the warrant and did not find any illegal weapons.
Ramirez filed suit under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents10 for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
The Fourth Amendment requires that a warrant must par-
ticularly describe the persons or things to be seized.  In this
case, the actual warrant completely lacked any description of
the items to be seized.  Furthermore, the Court concluded that
the more specific application did not save the warrant: “The
Fourth Amendment by its terms requires particularity in the
warrant, not in the supporting documents.”  The Court did not
decide, however, whether a detailed application that is incor-
porated by reference into the warrant would save the warrant
because that was not done in this case.  Finally, the Court deter-
mined that in light of these facts, the petitioner did not have
qualified immunity: “The answer depends on whether the right
that was transgressed was ‘clearly established’—that is,
‘whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his con-
duct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.’”  The Court
concluded that there was no way petitioner could have believed
the warrant was sufficient.
The Court, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice
Rehnquist, held in United States v. Flores-Montano11 that the
government’s authority to conduct suspicionless inspections at
the border includes the authority to remove, disassemble, and
reassemble an automobile’s gas tank.  Respondent was stopped
at the United States-Mexico border and delayed while customs
inspectors requested that a mechanic under contract with the
government come to the border station to remove respondent’s
gas tank.  The mechanic then disassembled the gas tank, and
the inspector found 37 kilograms of marijuana bricks con-
cealed in the gas tank.  Respondent moved to suppress the evi-
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dence, arguing that it was
obtained in violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights
because the inspectors did not
have sufficient probable cause
to conduct a search of his gas
tank.  However, according to
the Court, “the reasons that
might support a requirement
of some level of suspicion in
the case of highly intrusive
searches of the person—dig-
nity and privacy interests of
the person being searched—
simply do not carry over to
vehicles.”  Thus “[c]omplex
balancing tests to determine what is a ‘routine’ search of a vehi-
cle, as opposed to a more ‘intrusive’ search of a person, have no
place in border searches of vehicles.”  In support of its deter-
mination, the Court said that the “Government’s interest in pre-
venting the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its
zenith at the international border.”  The Court has continu-
ously determined that the “longstanding right of the sovereign
to protect itself” renders searches of persons and things rea-
sonable “simply by virtue of the fact they occur at the border.”
This interest is illustrated by the seizure of the drugs in this
case.
In Thornton v. United States,12 the Court determined that an
officer may search the passenger compartment of an automo-
bile, pursuant to New York v. Belton,13 even if he first makes
contact with the occupant after he or she has recently exited
the vehicle.  In this case, the officer, who noticed that peti-
tioner’s license tags did not match the vehicle petitioner was
driving, was not able to stop petitioner until the latter had
exited his vehicle.  Petitioner, who was acting nervously, con-
sented to a pat-down search and the officer discovered two
individual plastic baggies containing marijuana and crack
cocaine.  Petitioner was arrested, handcuffed, and placed in the
squad car.  The officer then performed a search of petitioner’s
automobile and found a gun beneath the driver’s seat.
Petitioner moved to suppress the firearm as fruit of an uncon-
stitutional search.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the five-person majority,
began the opinion with a synopsis of the Court’s decision in
Belton.  The Court, in Belton, had determined that “‘when a
policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of
an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that
arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.’”
In Belton, the Court relied on two justifications as set forth in
Chimel v. California:14 (1) the need to remove any weapon the
arrestee might possess or seek to use to avoid arrest; and (2)
“the need to prevent the concealment or destruction of evi-
dence.”  The Court concluded that when it articulated the rule
in Belton, it placed no reliance “on the fact that the officer in
Belton ordered the occupants out of the vehicle, or initiated
contact with them while they remained within it.”
Furthermore, it did not find these factors relevant: Belton’s
rationale provides no basis “to conclude that the span of the
area generally within the arrestee’s immediate control is deter-
mined by whether the arrestee exited the vehicle at the officer’s
direction, or whether the officer initiated contact with him
while he remained in the car.” According to the Court, for all
practical purposes, “the arrest of a suspect who is next to a
vehicle presents identical concerns regarding officer safety and
the destruction of evidence as the arrest of one who is inside
the vehicle.”  
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment but believed that
the reasoning in Chimel and Belton was inappropriate here:
petitioner was handcuffed and in the police car when the
search occurred and, therefore, the possibility that he would
grab a weapon to escape or destroy evidence was “remote in the
extreme.”  Instead, he would find the search lawful under a
more general interest: that “the car might contain evidence rel-
evant to the crime for which he was arrested.”  Justice Stevens,
dissenting, believed Belton veered away from the principles
stated in Chimel, solely for the purpose of establishing a bright-
line rule, and that it should be narrowly applied.  For anyone
who is not an actual occupant of a car, “Chimel itself provides
all the guidance that is necessary.”
In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court,15 Justice Kennedy,
writing for a 5-4 Court, held that Nevada’s “stop and identify”
statute did not violate the Fourth or Fifth Amendments.  An
officer responded to a call regarding a possible assault and
encountered petitioner, who was standing next to a parked
truck with a woman still inside the truck.  It was apparent that
the truck had been stopped quickly and that petitioner was
drunk.  Petitioner refused to give the police officer his name
and was arrested and prosecuted under Nevada’s “stop and
identify” statute, which makes it a misdemeanor for a person to
refuse to identify himself if stopped by an officer under “suspi-
cious circumstances surrounding his presence abroad.”  The
Court granted certiorari on direct appeal to address petitioner’s
contention that his conviction under Nevada’s statute violates
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.  
The Court began with the statement that “’interrogation
relating to one’s identity or a request for identification by the
police does not, by itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment
seizure.’”  In Terry v. Ohio,16 the Court “recognized that law
enforcement officers’ reasonable suspicion that a person may be
involved in criminal activity permits the officer to stop the per-
son for a brief time and take additional steps to investigate fur-
ther.”  The Court’s subsequent decisions make clear that “ques-
tions concerning a suspect’s identity are a routine and accepted
part of many Terry stops” and, furthermore, serve important
governmental interests, i.e., whether the suspect is wanted for
another crime or has a history of mental disorder.  The Fourth
Amendment “does not impose obligations on the citizen but
instead provides rights against the government.”  Therefore,
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while “the Fourth Amendment cannot require a suspect to
answer,” it does not necessarily prevent a state from compelling
a person to identify himself during a Terry stop.  According to
the Court, “[t]he principles in Terry permit a State to require a
suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop.”  As
for petitioner’s Fifth Amendment claim, the Court concludes
that it need not address whether the Nevada statute’s require-
ment that a person identify himself compels a “testimonial”
communication.  It concludes that petitioner’s argument must
fail because “in this case disclosure of his name presented no
reasonable danger of incrimination.”  
Justice Stevens dissented.  He concluded that the statute was
directed only at a specific class of persons, essentially, those
that are “targets of a criminal investigation.”  These people can
be prosecuted for crime if they do not identify themselves.
Under his view, the Fifth Amendment has no exception, includ-
ing this narrow one, to its “right to remain silent.”  Justice
Breyer, also dissenting, wrote because he believed a limit to a
Terry stop, which “invalidates laws that compel responses to
police questioning,” obviously invalidates Nevada’s law.  In
Terry, the Court set forth conditions to a Terry stop, what has
become known as the “reasonable suspicion” standard.  It is
well established that a Terry detainee need not answer any
questions posed to him by a police officer and Justice Breyer
saw no compelling reason to “reject this generation-old state-
ment of the law.”
FIFTH AMENDMENT
In a 5-4 decision, the Court, in Yarborough v. Alvarado,17
decided that consideration of age and inexperience when deter-
mining whether an individual is in custody for the purposes of
Miranda is inappropriate because the test is objective and these
factors introduce a subjective element.  Respondent, a 17-year-
old, agreed to help his friend steal a car in a parking mall.  His
friend pulled a gun and shot and killed Francisco Castaneda,
who refused to relinquish possession of his vehicle.
Respondent was taken to the police station by his parents for
an “interview” and questioned for two hours outside their pres-
ence.  He was not given warnings pursuant to Miranda v.
Arizona18 and eventually told the entire story to the officer,
including his role in the botched car-jacking.  Several months
later, respondent was charged with first-degree murder and
moved to suppress his statements made during the interview,
claiming he was in custody for the purposes of Miranda and,
therefore, entitled to warnings.  
The case was before the Court on a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section  2254; therefore,
the Court first recognized that it could reverse only if the lower
court applied “clearly established law” in an objectively unrea-
sonable manner.  The Court concluded that the lower court’s
determination under clearly established law that respondent
was not in custody for Miranda purposes was not objectively
unreasonable.  In Thompson v. Keohane,19 the Court had articu-
lated a two-step analysis to determine whether an individual
was in custody for the purposes of Miranda: “first, what were
the circumstances surround-
ing the interrogation; and,
second, given those circum-
stances, would a reasonable
person have felt he or she was
not at liberty to terminate the
interrogation and leave.”  The
Court concluded that in the
circumstances of the present
case, respondent was not in
custody: respondent was not
put under arrest; respondent’s parents, rather than the police,
had brought him to the station; the parents remained at the sta-
tion; and respondent was asked at least twice if he wanted to
take a break.  The Court also concluded, in the first instance,
that respondent’s age and inexperience were not factors that
should be considered in its analysis.  It said, “There is an
important conceptual difference between the Miranda custody
test and the line of cases from other contexts considering age
and experience”:  “the Miranda custody inquiry is an objective
test,” the others are not.  The Court did not wish to change the
nature of this test because the objective standard is “designed
to give clear guidance to the police, while consideration of a
suspect’s individual characteristics—including his age—could
be viewed as creating a subjective inquiry.”
Justice Breyer, dissenting, believed it was clear that respon-
dent was in custody: a reasonable person in respondent’s cir-
cumstances would not believe he was free to leave.
Furthermore, Justice Breyer argueds that respondent’s youth
did add to his interpretation of the situation and should be con-
sidered: “[A] 17-year-old is more likely than, say, a 35-year-old,
to take a police officer’s assertion of authority to keep parents
outside the room and as an assertion of authority to keep their
child inside as well.”  Justice Breyer viewed the respondent’s
age and inexperience as objective circumstances, which were
known to the police.
In Missouri v. Seibert,20 the Court determined that warned
statements obtained directly after an interrogation in which
Miranda warnings were not given were not admissible.
Respondent’s son, Jonathon, who had cerebral palsy, died in his
sleep and respondent was afraid she would be charged with
neglect because he had bed sores.  In the presence of respon-
dent, respondent’s other sons devised a plan to incinerate
Jonathon’s body by burning down their mobile home, thus
destroying any evidence that might have been used to prove
neglect.  They decided to leave Donald Rector, a mentally ill
teenager living with the family, in the home when they started
the fire so it would not appear that Jonathon had been left unat-
tended.  Donald died in the fire.  Police officers questioned
respondent for about 30 to 40 minutes without issuing her
Miranda warnings.  After the police elicited inculpatory state-
ments, they gave respondent her Miranda warnings and ques-
tioned her again, receiving the same inculpatory responses.
This interrogation technique is taught at numerous police
academies nationwide and is referred to as “question-first.”
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Under this technique, officers
interrogate a person in succes-
sive unwarned and warned
phases, only providing
Miranda warnings after the
officers have elicited inculpa-
tory statements.  
Justice Souter, writing for a
plurality that included Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
determined that exclusion of
both the warned and
unwarned statements was nec-
essary under the Fifth
Amendment.  The plurality recognized that “[j]ust as ‘no talis-
manic incantation [is] required to satisfy [Miranda’s] stric-
tures,’ . . . it would be absurd to think that mere recitation of
the litany suffices to satisfy Miranda in every conceivable cir-
cumstance.”  It concluded that “unless the warnings could
place a suspect who has just been interrogated in a position to
make such an informed choice, there is no practical justifica-
tion for accepting the formal warnings as compliant with
Miranda, or for treating the second stage of the interrogation as
distinct from the first, unwarned and inadmissible segment.”
Justice Breyer concurred, but believed the Court should
apply the “simple rule” and “exclude ‘fruits’ of the initial
unwarned questions unless the failure to warn was in good
faith.”  Justice Kennedy also concurred, concluding “[t]he
interrogation technique used in this case is designed to cir-
cumvent Miranda.”  However, he concluded that when the fail-
ure to warn is not “deliberate” and when “curative measures”
are taken, the second statements should be admissible.  Justice
O’Connor dissented on grounds that the Court specifically
rejected the subjective-based tests it applied in this case in
Oregon v. Elstad.21 In her view, since respondent’s statements
were voluntary, they were admissible.
The Court decided in United States v. Patane22 that Miranda
v. Arizona23 did not require the suppression of physical evi-
dence obtained in connection with unwarned but voluntary
statements.  In this case, two officers went to respondent’s
home to arrest respondent for violation of a restraining order.
One officer began to give respondent Miranda warnings but
was stopped by respondent before he finished.  Without com-
pleting the warnings, the officer, who had been tipped that
respondent illegally possessed a firearm, then questioned
respondent about the firearm.  Respondent eventually con-
fessed to having the firearm and permitted the officer to
retrieve it from the apartment.  Respondent sought to exclude
the firearm from evidence.
A three-justice plurality, in an opinion written by Justice
Thomas, determined that the fruit of the poisonous tree doc-
trine did not apply in these circumstances.  Fifth Amendment
prophylactic rules, like Miranda, sweep beyond the Self-
Incrimination Clause and, therefore, “any further extension of
these rules must be justified by its necessity for the protection
of the actual right against compelled self-incrimination.”
According to the plurality, “the Miranda rule ‘does not require
that the statements [taken without complying with the rule]
and their fruits be discarded as inherently tainted.’”  The plu-
rality made clear that “a mere failure to give Miranda warnings
does not, by itself, violate a suspect’s constitutional rights or
even the Miranda rule.”  Instead, the “nature of the right pro-
tected” is a “fundamental trial right.”  This right only relates to
the exclusion of testimonial evidence.  Therefore, the plurality
concluded that it follows then that “police do not violate a sus-
pect’s constitutional rights (or the Miranda rule) by negligent
or even deliberate failures to provide the suspect with the full
panoply of warning prescribed by Miranda.”  The violation
occurs “only upon the admission of unwarned statements into
evidence at trial.”
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O’Connor, concurred.  He
found it “unnecessary to decide whether the detective’s failure
to give respondent the full Miranda warning should be charac-
terized as a violation of the Miranda rule itself, or whether there
is ‘anything to deter’ so long as the unwarned statements are
not later introduced at trial.”  Instead, he relied on Oregon v.
Elstad,24 in which the Court held that evidence obtained fol-
lowing an unwarned interrogation was admissible.  Justice
Souter dissented, stating that the Court’s conclusion that “the
Fifth Amendment does not address the admissibility of nontes-
timonial evidence [is an] overstatement that is beside the
point.”  The issue was whether the application of the fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine should be applied “lest we create an
incentive for the police to omit Miranda warnings . . . before
custodial interrogation.”
SIXTH AMENDMENT
In Crawford v. Washington,25 the Court held the only indica-
tor of reliability that satisfies the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause is confrontation, meaning an out-of-
court statement by a witness is only admissible if (1) the wit-
ness is unavailable and (2) the accused had a prior opportunity
to cross-examine the witness.  Justice Scalia wrote for a seven-
person majority; Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice
O’Connor, filed a concurring opinion.  Petitioner was arrested
for assault and attempted murder and the State sought to intro-
duce at trial his wife’s tape-recorded statements previously
made to police during an interrogation.  The state could not
otherwise have her testify because of the state marital privilege,
“which generally bars a spouse from testifying without the
other spouse’s consent.”  The privilege does not apply, however,
to a spouse’s out-of-court statements admissible under a
hearsay exception.  To argue the tape-recorded statements were
admissible, Washington relied on Ohio v. Roberts,26 which held
that the constitutional right to confront witnesses “does not bar
admission of an unavailable witness’s statements against a crim-
inal defendant if the statement bears ‘adequate indicia of relia-
bility.’”  To meet this requirement, the evidence must either
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“[1] fall within a ‘firmly rooted hearsay exception’ or [2] bear
‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’”  
The Sixth Amendment requires that “‘in all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
with the witness against him.’”  The Court previously deter-
mined in Roberts that this “bedrock procedural guarantee” was
safeguarded even if it allowed into evidence a witness’s out-of-
court statements “so long as it has adequate indicia of reliabil-
ity—i.e., falls within a ‘firmly rooted hearsay exception’ or bears
‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’”  In this case,
however, the Court determined that Roberts was wrongly
decided.  To reach its conclusion, the Court turned to the his-
tory of the Sixth Amendment and concluded that it “supports
two inferences about the meaning of the Sixth Amendment:” (1)
“the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was
directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and par-
ticularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the
accused;” and (2) “that the Framers would not have allowed
admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not
appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the
defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”
The Court identified a “core class of ‘testimonial statements,’”
and concluded “interrogations by law enforcement officers fall
squarely within that class” of testimonial hearsay with which
the Sixth Amendment is concerned.  The Court also concluded
that the “text of the Sixth Amendment does not suggest any
open-ended exceptions from the confrontation requirement to
be developed by the courts.”  The only exceptions to the
accused’s right to confront those witnesses against him are those
that existed at the “time of the founding.”  As history illustrates,
the admission of prior “examinations” is conditioned on
“unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine.”  
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion, in
which he “dissent[ed] from the Court’s decision to overrule
[Roberts].”  He believed the Court’s distinction between testi-
monial and nontestimonial statements “is no better rooted in
history than our current doctrine.”  His own analysis of the his-
tory of the Sixth Amendment revealed that there existed a less
concrete common-law rule regarding confrontation.  He argued
that “[e]xceptions to confrontation have always been derived
from the experience that some out-of-court statements are just
as reliable as cross-examined in-court testimony due to the cir-
cumstances under which they were made.”  He would, how-
ever, reverse the judgment based on existing law.
In Blakely v. Washington,27 a 5-4 Court determined that a
court cannot impose an “exceptional” sentence that exceeds
the “ordinary” maximum sentence, but not the statutory max-
imum, based upon a judicial determination of aggravating fac-
tors.  Petitioner reached a plea agreement with respect to
charges for second-degree kidnapping, involving domestic vio-
lence and use of a firearm.  During sentencing, the judge, pur-
suant to Washington law, imposed a sentence of 90 months,
which was above the “standard range” of 59 to 53 months,
upon finding “‘substantial and compelling reasons justifying an
exceptional sentence.”  The sentence, however, still fell within
the statutory maximum of ten
years.  The findings upon
which the judge relied to sup-
port the “exceptional sen-
tence” were not those used to
support the underlying sen-
tence.  
Justice Scalia, writing for
the Court, determined that
the imposition of the
enhanced sentence violated
petitioner’s Sixth Amendment
right to a trial by jury as set
forth in Apprendi v. New
Jersey.28 Apprendi states that
“[o]ther than the fact of a
prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statu-
tory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond
a reasonable doubt.’”  In Ring v. Arizona,29 the Court extended
Apprendi to capital sentencing.  As in Apprendi, the Court con-
cluded that “the defendant’s constitutional rights had been vio-
lated because the judge had imposed a sentence greater than
the maximum he could have imposed under state law without
the challenged factual finding.”  In Blakely, the Court extended
Apprendi to circumstances where a judge has found aggravating
factors and imposed a sentence above the “standard range,”
even though it still falls within statutory maximum.  In
response to the dissents, the Court said why it followed
Apprendi: “Our commitment to Apprendi in this context reflects
not just respect for longstanding precedent, but the need to
give intelligible content to the right of jury trial.”  Under the
constitution, “a jury trial is meant to ensure [the people’s] con-
trol of the judiciary.”  The Court’s rule in Apprendi “carries out
this design by ensuring that the judge’s authority to sentence
derives wholly from the jury’s verdict.”
Justice O’Connor dissented, focusing most of her opinion on
the perceived  ill-effects of the decision.  She concluded: “What
I have feared most has now come to pass: Over 20 years of sen-
tencing reform are all but lost, and tens of thousands of crimi-
nal judgments are in jeopardy.”  Justice Kennedy agreed, but
wrote to add one more criticism: “The Court . . . disregards the
fundamental principle under our constitutional system that dif-
ferent branches of government ‘converse with each other on
matters of vital common interest.’”  Sentencing guidelines are
one example where case-by-case judicial determinations have
been “refined by legislature and codified into statutes or rules
as general standards.”  Because of the Court’s decision,
“[n]umerous States that have enacted sentencing guidelines
similar to the one in Washington State are now commanded to
scrap everything and start over.”  Justice Breyer, also dissenting,
categorized Apprendi as an “impulse,” easily understood as the
Court’s attempt to control widely disparate sentences.  He
wrote that the purpose of the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury
trial is for “fairness and effectiveness of a sentencing system.”
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In his view, however, the
Court’s Blakely decision  “pre-
vents the legislature from
seeking sentencing systems
that are consistent with, and
indeed may help to advance,
the Constitution’s greater fair-
ness goals.”
In Fellers v. United States,30
Justice O’Connor, writing for a
unanimous Court, held that
statements “deliberately
elicited” by police officers after an individual has been indicted
by a grand jury violate his Sixth Amendment right to counsel;
therefore, any fruits analysis must be conducted under the
Sixth Amendment as opposed to the Fifth Amendment.  Fellers
was indicted by a grand jury.  When police officers went to
Fellers’s home to arrest him, they questioned him prior to
advising him of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona31 and
Patterson v. Illinois,32 the latter having extended Miranda to the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  Petitioner made inculpa-
tory statements, which were repeated later at the jailhouse after
he received the proper warnings.  He sought to exclude all the
statements from evidence.  
The Court began its opinion by stating that Fellers’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel was triggered when the grand jury
issued the indictment.  Under the Sixth Amendment, to deter-
mine whether the right to counsel has been violated, the Court
“consistently applie[s] the deliberate-elicitation standard.”  In
this case, it concluded that the statements taken from Fellers at
his home were “deliberately elicited” and, therefore, obtained
in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.  Furthermore, as to
the jailhouse statements, the Court concluded that a fruits
analysis should not be conducted under the Fifth Amendment.
In Oregon v. Elstad,33 the Court determined that “‘[t]hough
Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be sup-
pressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should
turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly
and voluntarily made.’”  However, the Court has not yet deter-
mined “whether the rationale of Elstad applies when a suspect
makes incriminating statements after a knowing and voluntary
waiver of his right to counsel notwithstanding earlier police
questioning in violation of Sixth Amendment standards.”
Therefore, it remanded the case to allow the lower courts “to
address this issue in the first instance.”
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion for a unanimous
Court in Iowa v. Tovar,34 which held that the Sixth Amendment
does not require a trial court to admonish the defendant, before
accepting a guilty plea, that by waiving counsel (1) defendant
will not obtain an independent opinion whether it is wise to
plead guilty and (2) defendant risks overlooking a viable
defense; the Sixth Amendment only requires that waiver of
counsel be knowing and intelligent and during pretrial pro-
ceedings the warnings required to meet that standard are less
rigorous than if an accused is waiving his right to trial counsel.
Tovar was arrested numerous times for operating a motor vehi-
cle while under the influence of alcohol.  Under Iowa law, his
last and third offense was a “class ‘D’ felon[y].”  Tovar argued
his first OWI “could not be used to enhance the December
2000 OWI charge from the second-offense aggravated misde-
meanor to a third-offense felony”  because “his 1996 waiver of
counsel was invalid—not ‘full knowing, intelligent, and volun-
tary’—because he was ‘never made aware by the court . . . of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.’”  The trial
court conducted a “guilty plea colloquy” as required by Iowa
criminal procedure.  The Iowa Supreme Court, however, deter-
mined that the following elements were also necessary to sat-
isfy the Sixth Amendment: (1) “‘that there are defenses to crim-
inal charges that may not be known by laypersons and that the
danger in waiving the assistance of counsel in deciding whether
to plead guilty is the risk that a viable defense will be over-
looked;’” (2) that the defendant “‘will lose the opportunity to
obtain an independent opinion on whether, under the facts and
applicable law, it is wise to plead guilty;’” and (3) “‘the defen-
dant understands the nature of the charges against him and the
range of allowable punishments.’”  While the trial court cov-
ered the last point, it did not warn Tovar about the first two.  
The Court determined that the specific warnings set forth by
the Iowa Supreme Court were not necessary.  While a plea hear-
ing qualifies as a “critical stage” in the criminal process, trig-
gering the Sixth Amendment, the Court has not previously
“prescribed any formula or script to be read to a defendant who
states that he elects to proceed without counsel.”  Instead, it
only requires that waiver of counsel be intelligent, i.e., the
“‘choice is made with eyes open.’”  Therefore, while a trial
court’s warning for waiver of trial counsel “must be
‘rigorous[ly]’ conveyed,”  “at the earlier stages of the criminal
process, a less searching or formal colloquy may suffice.”  The
Court concluded that in this case, “Iowa’s plea colloquy suffices
both to advise a defendant of his right to counsel, and to assure
that his guilty plea is informed and voluntary.”  The Court also
determined that in order to decide this case, it need not
“endorse the State’s position that nothing more than the plea
colloquy was needed to safeguard Tovar’s right to counsel.”
The question is narrower: “‘Does the Sixth Amendment require
a court to give a rigid and detailed admonishment to a pro se
defendant pleading guilty of the usefulness of an attorney, that
an attorney may provide an independent opinion whether it is
wise to plead guilty and that without an attorney the defendant
risks overlooking a defense?’”  The Court answered the ques-
tion in the negative and concluded that these two specific
admonishments were not required by the Sixth Amendment.
CRIMINAL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Justice Souter delivered the eight-justice majority opinion in
United States v. Dominguez Benitez,35 which held that “a defen-
dant who seeks reversal of his conviction after a guilty plea, on
the ground that the district court committed plain error under
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Rule 11, must show a reasonable probability that, but for the
error, he would not have entered the plea.”  After lengthy nego-
tiations, respondent entered into a plea agreement regarding
charges of possession and conspiracy to possess methamphet-
amine.  As part of the plea, it was also agreed that the govern-
ment would stipulate that respondent “would receive what is
known as a safety-valve reduction of two levels.”  When
accepting the plea, the District Court gave most of the warn-
ings under Rule 11, but “failed to mention that [respondent]
could not withdraw his plea if the court did not accept the
Government’s recommendations.”  However, this admonition
was set forth in the written plea agreement.  It was later dis-
covered that respondent was not eligible for the safety valve
and was sentenced to the mandatory minimum.  Respondent
appealed, claiming “that the District Court’s failure to warn
him, as Rule 11(c)(3)(B) instructs, that he could not withdraw
his guilty plea if the court did not accept the Government’s rec-
ommendations, required reversal.”  The Court disagreed.
Although Rule 11 requires a court to instruct a defendant that
he may not withdraw his guilty plea if the court does not
except the government’s recommendation, it also instructs that
“not every violation of its terms call for reversal of conviction
by entitling the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.”  The
Court, in United States v. Vonn,36 “considered the standard that
applies when a defendant is dilatory in raising Rule 11 error,
and held that reversal is not in order unless the error is plain.”
The Court did not, however, “formulate the standard for deter-
mining whether a defendant has shown, as the plain-error
standard requires . . . an effect on his substantial rights.”   In
this case, the Court concluded that a prejudicial standard
applies, relying on three reasons: (1) “the standard should
enforce the policies that underpin Rule 52(b) generally, to
encourage timely objections and reduce wasteful reversals by
demanding strenuous exertion to get relief for unpreserved
error;” (2) the standard “should respect the particular impor-
tance of the finality of guilty pleas;” and (3) at least in this
case, “the reasons are contemplated by the fact, worth repeat-
ing, that the violation claimed was of Rule 11, not due
process.”
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, but wrote sepa-
rately because he disagrees that “respondent need not show
prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence.”  He writes,
“this Court has adopted no fewer than four assertedly different
standards of probability relating to the assessment of whether
the outcome of trial would have been different if error had not
occurred, or if omitted evidence had been included.”  Justice
Scalia believed the only “serviceable standards are the tradi-
tional ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ and ‘more likely than not.’”  
In Sabri v. United States,37 Justice Souter delivered the opin-
ion of the Court, which held that Congress had the power to
enact a federal bribery law, which provides criminal penalties
for anyone who attempts to bribe or bribes a state or local offi-
cial of an entity receiving federal funding, under the Necessary
and Proper Clause of Article I of the Constitution.  Justice
Souter was joined in full by six justices, with Justices Scalia
and Kennedy concurring in
the judgment and in part.
Justice Thomas concurred in
the judgment.  18 U.S.C. sec-
tion 666(a)(2) imposes federal
criminal penalties for anyone
who bribes an individual if
that individual is part of an
organization, government, or
agency that receives, in any
one-year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 from the federal
government.  Petitioner was convicted for offering three sepa-
rate bribes to a city councilman, Brian Herron, who also served
as a member on the Board of Commissioners for the
Minneapolis Community Development Agency, in connection
with a real estate development project.  Petitioner challenged
his indictment on the grounds “that [section] 666(a)(2) is
unconstitutional on its face for failure to require proof of a
connection between the federal funds and the alleged bribe, as
an element of liability.”
The Court concluded that Article I power does not require
proof of a connection between federal money as an element of
the offense.  Under Article I, Congress has the power under the
Spending Clause to “appropriate federal monies to promote
the general welfare.”  Under its corresponding authority in the
Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress has the power “to see
to it that taxpayer dollars appropriated under that power are in
fact spent for the general welfare, and not frittered away in
graft or on projects undermined when funds are siphoned off
or corrupt public officers are derelict about demanding value
for dollars.”  According to the Court, section 666(a)(2)
“addresses these problems at the sources of bribes, by rational
means, to safeguard the integrity of the state, local, and tribal
recipients of federal dollars.”  The Court recognized that not
every bribe covered by section 666(a)(2) will be traceable from
federal funds or constitute a quid pro quo for some dereliction
in spending of a federal grant.  However, “this possibility por-
tends no enforcement beyond the scope of federal interest, for
the reason that corruption does not have to be that limited to
affect the federal interest.”
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
Justice Breyer, joined by seven other justices, delivered the
opinion of the Court in Castro v. United States,38 resolving a
split among the circuits.  It held that a court cannot recharac-
terize a pro se litigant’s motion as the litigant’s first motion
under 28 U.S.C. section 2255 unless the court: (1) informs the
litigant of its intent to recharacterize the motion; (2) warns the
litigant that the recharacterization will subject subsequent sec-
tion 2255 motions to the law’s “second or successive” restric-
tions; and (3) provides a litigant with the opportunity to with-
draw or amend the filing.  In 1994, petitioner filed a motion
with the district court, which he classified as a Rule 33 motion.
In its decision, the district court referred to the motion as both
a Rule 33 and a section 2255 motion.  The Eleventh Circuit
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affirmed the district court’s
dismissal of the motion.  In
1997, petitioner filed a section
2255 motion and the govern-
ment sought to have it dis-
missed on the ground that
petitioner had failed to com-
ply with section 2255’s restric-
tive “second or successive”
conditions.  The Court deter-
mined that the 1997 motion
was not a “second or succes-
sive” motion because the 1994 was not properly reclassified as
a second 2255 motion.  The Court recognized that courts may
sometimes recharacterize pro se motions, but when a court
decides to recharacterize a motion as a section 2255 motion,
because of section 2255’s restrictions, it must give the warn-
ings set forth above.  The Court noted that even the govern-
ment suggested that the Court has the power to create such a
rule based on the following grounds: (1) under the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure 47, (2) under its authority to
“regulate the practice through ‘the exercise’ of our ‘supervisory
powers’ over the federal judiciary,” and (3) because it “is likely
to reduce and simplify litigation over questions of characteri-
zation, which are often quite difficult.”  
Justice Scalia wrote separately, concurring in the judgment
and in only the first two parts of the majority’s opinion.  He
disagreed with “the Court’s laissez-faire attitude toward rechar-
acterization.”  He believed the Court had erred by promulgat-
ing a new rule without placing limitations on when recharac-
terization can occur, including the fact that the Court has
failed to provide a pro se litigant the opportunity “to insist that
the district court rule on his motion as filed.”  He argued that
when, as here, there is nothing to be gained by recharacteriza-
tion, a district court should not be allowed to recharacterize a
motion.  In this case, Castro’s Rule 33 motion was “valid as a
procedural manner, and the claim it raised was no weaker on
the merits when presented under Rule 33 than when presented
under [section] 2255.”  Therefore, the recharacterization was
improper.
In Pliler v. Ford,39 Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of
the Court, which held that a district court is not required to
issue the following warnings to a pro se habeas petitioner: (1)
the court can stay the petitioner’s motion only if he chooses to
dismiss the unexhausted claims from a mixed petition and (2)
that the one-year statute of limitations under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) will bar refiling of
the petition if he dismissed the action to exhaust the non-
exhausted claims.  Respondent filed two pro se federal peti-
tions for habeas corpus five days before the statute of limita-
tions ran under the AEDPA.  Some of the claims in each of the
petitions had not been exhausted in state court.  The district
court gave petitioner three options: (1) the petitions could be
dismissed without prejudice and respondent could refile after
exhausting the unexhausted claims; (2) the unexhausted
claims could be dismissed and respondent could proceed with
only the exhausted claims; or (3) respondent could contest the
magistrate judge’s finding that some of the claims had not been
exhausted.  Respondent chose to exhaust his nonexhausted
claims.  When he sought to refile after exhausting his non-
exhausted claims, his petitions were dismissed because the
one-year statute of limitations had run.  
Under Rose v. Lundy,40 “federal district courts must dismiss
mixed habeas petitions.”  To avoid statute of limitations prob-
lems, the Ninth Circuit had adopted the “stay-and-abeyance”
procedure, which involves three steps: (1) “the dismissal of
any unexhausted claims from the original mixed petition,” (2)
“a stay of the remaining claims, pending exhaustion of the dis-
missed unexhausted claims in state court,” and (3) “amend-
ment of the original petition to add the newly exhausted claims
that then relate back to the original petition.”  In this case, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court was required to
advise respondent that it could only consider petitioner’s stay
motions if petitioner dismissed the nonexhausted claims and
then “renewed the prematurely filed stay motions.”  It also
concluded that the district court committed prejudicial error
by failing to inform respondent that the one-year statute of
limitations had run. The Court, without addressing the Ninth
Circuit’s stay-and-abeyance procedures, determined that a dis-
trict court is not required to give the warnings set forth by the
Ninth Circuit.  Rose only requires that the district court dis-
miss mixed petitions, which results, of course, in the prisoner
being obligated to follow one of the two paths.  However, noth-
ing in Rose obligates that these “options be equally attractive,
much less suggests that district court give specific advisements
as to the availability and wisdom of these options.”
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court in
Banks v. Dretke,41 which held that discovery and an evidentiary
hearing is authorized in a federal habeas corpus proceeding
when the state has concealed exculpatory or impeaching evi-
dence and the petitioner has met the requirement of Brady v.
Maryland.42 Furthermore, the Court concluded, in a pre-
AEDPA habeas proceeding, Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure applies and the state may waive by its actions
procedural default and exhaustion remedies.  Petitioner was
convicted of first-degree murder.  The prosecution used the
testimony of a paid police informant, Robert Farr, in both its
case-in-chief and in the penalty phase of the trial, without dis-
closing the fact that Farr was a paid police informant, although
that information was requested and the state indicated that it
would disclose all necessary information.  The prosecution
also used the testimony of another witness, Charles Cook, in
its case-in-chief, who stated many times on cross-examination
that he had not “talked to anyone about his testimony.”  This
was a misrepresentation that was not corrected by the prose-
cution.  In 1996, Banks filed a petition for a writ of habeas cor-
pus, asserting: (1) “that the State had withheld material excul-
patory evidence ‘revealing Robert Farr as a police informant
and Mr. Banks’ arrest as a set-up” (“Farr Brady claim”); and (2)
“that the State had concealed ‘Cook’s enormous incentive to
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testify in a manner favorable to the [prosecution]’” (“Cook
Brady claim”). In June 1998, “Banks moved for discovery and
an evidentiary hearing to gain information from the State on
the roles played and trial testimony provided by Farr and
Cook.”  The magistrate judge allowed limited discovery for
Cook, but denied it as to Farr, stating Banks had not provided
sufficient justification.  In 1999, Banks renewed his request for
discovery and an evidentiary hearing, “[t]his time, . . . [prof-
fering] affidavits from both Farr and Cook to back up his
claims that, as to each of these two key witnesses, the prose-
cution had wrongly withheld crucial exculpatory and
impeaching evidence.”  The magistrate judge then ordered dis-
covery and, for the first time, two things were disclosed: (1)
Cook had been extensively coached prior to his testimony at
Banks’s trial and (2) “that Farr was an informant and that he
had been paid $200 for his involvement in the case.”
In the first part of its opinion, the Court addressed Banks’s
Farr Brady claim.  The Court determined that Banks had
exhausted his state remedies because his state-court applica-
tion alleged “the prosecution knowingly failed to turn over
exculpatory evidence involving Farr in violation of Banks’s due
process rights.”  However, because Banks failed to produce any
evidence to support his claim, he must “show cause for his fail-
ure to develop the facts in state-court proceedings and actual
prejudice resulting from that failure.”  In Strickler v. Greene,43
the Court set forth the three essential elements to establish a
Brady prosecutorial misconduct claim: (1) the evidence at
issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is
exculpatory or is impeaching, (2) the “evidence must have
been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently,”
and (3) “prejudice must have ensued.”  The Court said that
“‘[c]ause and prejudice’ in this case ‘parallels two of the three
components of the alleged Brady violation itself.’”  It also con-
cluded that Banks satisfies the three requirements.  First, the
suppressed evidence “qualifies as evidence advantageous to
Banks.”  As to “cause,” the Court determined that “Banks’s fail-
ure to develop the facts in state-court proceedings is informed
by Strickler.”  In Strickler, as in this case, the prosecutor told
the defense it would open the state files and there was no need
for a formal Brady motion.  However, the file was missing sev-
eral important documents.  In Strickler, the Court determined
that the “petitioner has shown cause for his failure to raise a
Brady claim in state court,” relying on three factors: (1) “‘the
prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence;’” (2) petitioner
reasonably relied on the prosecution’s “open-file” policy; and
(3) “‘the [State] confirmed petitioner’s reliance on the open-file
policy by asserting during state habeas proceedings that peti-
tioner had already received everything known to the govern-
ment.’”  The Court concluded that this case was “congruent
with Strickler in all three respects.” 
In the second part of the opinion, the Court addressed
Banks’s Cook Brady claim.  The Fifth Circuit determined that
Banks had failed to develop the facts underpinning the claim
in his 1992 state petition, making the evidentiary hearing
ordered by the magistrate judge unwarranted.  It denied the
certificate of appealability “apparently” because it regarded
Rule 15(b) as inapplicable in a
federal habeas proceeding.  Rule
15 states in part that “when
issues not raised by the plead-
ings are tried by express or
implied consent of the parties,
they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings.”  The
Court states that “[w]e have
twice before referenced Rule
15(b)’s application in federal
habeas proceedings,” and have concluded that it applies.  In
this case, there is no “reason why an evidentiary hearing
should not qualify [for Rule 15(b) purposes] so long as the
respondent gave ‘any sort of consent’ and has a full and fair
‘opportunity to present evidence bearing on the claim’s resolu-
tion.’”  The Court did not believe, as the Fifth Circuit cau-
tioned, that such a rule would “undermine the State’s exhaus-
tion and procedural default defenses.”  Pre-AEDPA, “there was
no inconsistency between Rule 15(b) and those defenses”
because “exhaustion and procedural default defenses could be
waived based on the State’s litigation conduct.”  Because Banks
could have “‘demonstrate[d] that jurists of reason could dis-
agree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional
claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,’” the
Court concluded a certificate of appealability should have
issued.
In an 8-1 decision, the Court, in Baldwin v. Reese,44 held that
a state prisoner does not satisfy the “fair presentation” require-
ment of 28 U.S.C. section 2254 when a state court must read
beyond the petition, brief, or other papers to be alerted to the
federal nature of the claims.  Respondent’s petition for review
in the Oregon Supreme Court did not allege “his separate
appellate ‘ineffective assistance’ claim violated federal law.”
After review was denied, respondent brought a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in federal court, raising the claim.  The
district court dismissed the claim because respondent had
failed to “fairly present” it in highest state court.  A divided
panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed and found that Reese had
fairly presented the claim because the Oregon Supreme Court
“had ‘the opportunity to read . . . the lower court decision
claimed to be in error before deciding whether to grant discre-
tionary review.’”  Justice Breyer, writing for the majority,
reversed.  The Court held that “to say that a petitioner ‘fairly
presents’ a federal claim only by reading lower court opinions
in the case is to say that those judges must read the lower court
opinions—for otherwise they would forfeit the State’s oppor-
tunity to decide that federal claim in the first instance.”
Federal habeas law does not impose such a requirement.  The
Court also concluded that the federal claim was not “fairly pre-
sented” because the state and federal claims were virtually
identical.  
Justice Stevens, dissenting, said “[i]t is appropriate to disre-
gard this Court’s Rule 15.2 and permit respondents to defend a
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judgment on grounds not
raised in the brief in opposi-
tion when the omitted issue
is ‘predicate to an intelligent
resolution of the question
presented.’”  In this
instance, he would consider
Reese’s last argument and,
since there is “no significant
difference between” the
state and federal claims,
find that “the state courts
did have a fair opportunity to assess [Reese’s] federal claim.”
In Dretke v. Haley,45 a 6-3 Court determined that when faced
with a claim of actual innocence, whether of a sentence or a
crime charged, a court must first address all non-defaulted
claims for comparable relief and other grounds for cause to
excuse the procedural default.  Respondent was convicted of
theft and under a habitual offender statute, even though he did
not meet the elements necessary for the habitual offender
statute.  Respondent did not, however, challenge his convic-
tion based on actual innocence until his petition for habeas
relief in state court.  The state court denied his claim because
it was not raised on direct appeal, but on federal habeas review,
the Fifth Circuit reversed, “holding narrowly that the actual
innocence exception ‘applies to noncapital sentencing proce-
dures involving a career offender or habitual felony offender.’”  
The Court has recognized “an equitable exception to the bar
when a habeas applicant can demonstrate cause and prejudice
for the procedural default.”  Because the “cause and prejudice”
standard is not a “perfect safeguard,” the Court, in Murray v.
Carrier,46 recognized “a narrow exception to the cause require-
ment where a constitutional violation has ‘probably resulted’ in
the conviction of one who is ‘actually innocent’ of the sub-
stantive offense.”  Sawyer v. Whitley47 extended this exception
to capital sentencing errors.  In the case before it, the Court
declined to extend this “narrow exception” to noncapital sen-
tencing, stating “that a federal court faced with allegations of
actual innocence, whether of the sentence or of the crime
charged, must first address all nondefaulted claims for compa-
rable relief and other grounds for cause to excuse procedural
default.”  The Court finds that this avoidance principal was
“implicit” in Carrier.  In this case, Petitioner “has conceded
. . . that respondent has a viable and ‘significant’ ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.”  Therefore, this claim should be
addressed first.    
Justice Stevens dissented, finding that “[t]he unending
search for symmetry in the law can cause judges to forget
about justice.”  In his view, this was a simple case: “because the
constitutional error clearly and concededly resulted in the
imposition of an unauthorized sentence, it also follows that
respondent is a ‘victim of a miscarriage of justice.’”  Justice
Kennedy, in his own dissenting opinion, added that “[t]he case
also merits this further comment concerning the larger obliga-
tion of state or federal officials when they know an individual
has been sentenced for a crime he did not commit.”  He
believed the state should have taken steps to “vindicate” these
interests in the first place and not attempt to keep Haley incar-
cerated for a crime he did not commit.
In a 6-3 decision, written by Justice O’Connor, the Court, in
Tennard v. Dretke,48 held that the only question to be answered
in determining whether to issue a certificate of appealability is
whether a reasonable juror could find the determination of the
district court debatable or wrong; a petitioner need not make a
threshold showing that he suffered from a “uniquely severe
permanent handicap” or show a nexus between his impaired
intellectual functioning and the crime committed to satisfy
Penre I and obtain a certificate of appealability. Petitioner was
convicted by a jury of capital murder in 1986.  During the
penalty phase of the trial, defense introduced evidence of
Tennard’s low IQ, which the prosecution argued was irrelevant.
Tennard sought post-conviction relief, arguing that in light of
the instructions given to the jury, his death sentence “had been
obtained in violation of the Eighth Amendment as interpreted
by this Court in Penry I.”  In Penry v. Lynaugh,49 the Court held,
in invalidating the very same instructions that were given to
Tennard’s jury, that it was not enough to give mitigating evi-
dence to the sentencer, “‘[t]he sentencer must also be able to
consider and give effect to that evidence in imposing sen-
tence.’”   The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded
Tennard was not entitled to a certificate of appealability for two
reasons: (1) “evidence of low IQ alone does not constitute a
uniquely severe condition,” and (2) “even if Tennard’s evi-
dence was mental retardation evidence, his claim must fail
because he did not show that the crime he committed was
attributable to his low IQ.”  In reversing and remanding, the
Court determined the Fifth Circuit “invoked its own restrictive
gloss on Penry I”: “Neither Penry I nor its progeny screened
mitigating evidence for ‘constitutional relevance’ before con-
sidering whether the jury instructions comported with the
Eighth Amendment.”  The proper analysis of Tennard’s claim
asks whether “Tennard [has] ‘demonstrate[d] that reasonable
jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the consti-
tutional claims debatable or wrong?’”  The Court concluded
that reasonable jurists could conclude that low IQ was relevant
mitigating evidence and that “the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals’ application of Penry to the facts of Tennard’s case was
unreasonable.”  The Court concluded that “[i]mpaired intel-
lectual functioning has mitigating dimensions beyond the
impact it has on the individual’s ability to act deliberately.”
HABEAS CORPUS – NEW RULES
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of a 5-4 Court in
Beard v. Banks.50 It held the Court’s decision in Mills v.
Maryland,51 which forbids a state from imposing a requirement
of unanimity before a mitigating factor can be considered in a
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sentencing decision, does not apply retroactively.  Respondent
was convicted of murder and sentenced to death prior to the
Court’s decision in Mills.  Under Teague v. Lane,52 to determine
whether a constitutional rule of criminal procedure applies to
a case on collateral review, a court must: (1) “determine when
the defendant’s conviction became final;” (2) “ascertain the
‘legal landscape’ as it then existed,” and (3) “ask whether the
Constitution, as interpreted by the precedent then existing,
compels the rule.”  As to the last step, the court essentially
must determine whether the rule is “new.”  If it is “new,” the
court must consider “whether it falls within either of the two
exceptions to nonretroactivity.”  Teague’s bar on retroactivity
does not apply if: (1) it is a rule “forbidding punishment ‘of
certain primary conduct [or . . . ] . . . prohibiting a certain cat-
egory of punishment for a class of defendants because of their
status or offense,’” or (2) it is a “‘watershed rule of criminal
procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy
of the criminal proceedings.’”  The Court concluded that it was
clear that respondent’s conviction became final prior to its
decision in Mills.  It also concluded that the rule announced in
Mills was new, finding that existing precedent, i.e., Lockett v.
Ohio,53 and its progeny, did not mandate the rule in Mills.
Because the Court summarily concluded that the first non-
retroactive exception in Teague did not apply, it only discusses
the second, stating that it has “repeatedly emphasized the lim-
ited scope of the second Teague exception, explaining that ‘it is
clearly meant to apply only to a small core of rules requiring
some observance of those procedures that . . . are implicit in
the concept of orderly liberty.’”  The Court has yet to find a rule
that falls within this exception and found that the Mills rule
not to be the first one.  While recognizing that Mills helps
avoid the “potentially arbitrary impositions of the death sen-
tence,” “the fact that a new rule removes some remote possi-
bility of arbitrary infliction of the death sentence does not suf-
fice to bring it within Teague’s second exception.”  However
laudable, “‘it has none of the primacy and centrality” necessary
for it to fall under the exception.
In Schriro v. Summerlin,54 a 5-4 Court, in an opinion written
by Justice Scalia, determined that its decision in Ring v.
Arizona,55 which requires a jury determine the existence of
aggravating factors used to impose a death sentence, was a pro-
cedural rule, but not a “watershed rule of criminal procedure”
that requires retroactive application.  While respondent’s case
was pending on federal habeas review, the Court decided
Apprendi v. New Jersey,56 which “interpreted the constitutional
due-process and jury-trial guarantees to require that, ‘[o]ther
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt,’” and Ring, which applied Apprendi’s rule to a death sen-
tence.  Respondent challenged his death sentence by arguing
that the judge, not the jury, found the existence of aggravating
factors.  The Court determined that the rule announced in Ring
was procedural and, therefore, the rules regarding retroactive
application as expressed in Teague v. Lane apply.57 It does not,
however, believe Ring announced a “watershed rule of criminal
procedure,” thereby falling into one of the exceptions for
retroactive application.  The purpose behind Ring was the
Court’s determination that it is the jury’s, and not the judge’s,
role to decide whether aggravating factors exist.  However,
there is no unequivocal evidence to suggest that a judge is a
less accurate factfinder than a jury, meaning that a determina-
tion by a judge carries an “’impermissibly large risk’” of pun-
ishing conduct the law does not reach.  The Court turned to its
decision in DeStefano v. Woods58 for support.  In DeStefano, the
Court “refused to give retroactive effect to Duncan v.
Louisiana,59 which applied the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial
guarantee to the States.”  The Court here said that in deciding
DeStefano, it had determined “that, although ‘the right to jury
trial generally tends to prevent arbitrariness and repression[,]
. . . [w]e would not assert . . . that every criminal trial—or any
particular trial—held before a judge alone is unfair or that a
defendant may never be as fairly treated by a judge as he would
a jury.’”
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